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Abstract. This workshop aimed to bring together an international group
of historians of mathematics to reflect upon the role played by tacit knowl-
edge in doing mathematics at various times and places. The existence of
tacit knowledge in contemporary mathematics is familiar to anyone who has
ever been given an idea of how a particular proof or theory “works” by a
verbal analogy or diagrammatic explanation that one would never consider
publishing. Something of it is felt by every student of mathematics, when
the process of learning mathematics often amounts to training the right re-
flexes. In more advanced contexts, the tacit understanding that a particular
technique, instrument or approach is “the one to use” in a given circum-
stance gives another familiar instance. Tacit knowledge, a term introduced
by the philosopher M. Polanyi, contrasts with the explicit knowledge that in
almost all historical mathematical cultures is associated with mathematical
text. The workshop invited a use of the categories of tacit and explicit knowl-
edge to achieve a better knowledge of how mathematical creation proceeds,
and also of how cultural habits play a tacit role in mathematical production.
The meeting intended to offer the possibility of significant innovation and
enrichment of historical method, as well as new and compelling insight into
the process of creating mathematics in different times and places. The meet-
ing was intended to afford the opportunity for a presentation of selected case
studies by leading experts and new scholars. In retrospect, as we hope these
abstracts show, the results promise to be of significant interest not only to
historians, but to the mathematical community more broadly.
Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 01A.
Introduction by the Organisers
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The aim of this workshop was to bring together an international group of historians
of mathematics to reflect upon the role played by tacit, as opposed to explicit
knowledge in doing mathematics at various times and places. Methodological
discussions on the use of this concept alternated with specific case studies from
the history of mathematics. The aim was to allow a better understanding of
mathematical practices in given contexts. The theme impinges on the transmission
of existing mathematics as well on the creation of new theories and results.
The existence of tacit knowledge in contemporary mathematics is familiar to
anyone who has ever been given an idea of how a particular proof or theory “works”
by a verbal analogy or diagrammatic explanation that one would never consider
publishing. Something of it is felt by every student of mathematics, when the
process of learning mathematics often amounts to training the right reflexes. In
more advanced contexts, the tacit understanding that a particular book or paper
or approach is “the one to use” in a given circumstance gives another familiar
instance. The theme was specifically chosen for this meeting on the history of
mathematics in view of its inspirational and unifying potential, and in the ways
that it promised to shed light on methods for understanding mathematical texts
and practices of the past. Originally, our plan was to look at cases that range from
the most ancient history of mathematics to current developments. We include here
the original list of examples, and the reader can compare this to the actual papers,
which achieved a comparable breadth while highlighting rather different features:
• The difference between algorithmic mathematics (like in ancient Mesopo-
tamia or medieval China) and proof-oriented mathematics in the Euclidean
tradition and the intermediate stages, like Chinese two-column algorithmic
texts which are proof-driven but not in the Euclidean style are all too often
analyzed without taking into account the parts of the practice that remain
tacit and are not spelled out in the text, contributing thus to give a biased
image of that difference.
• Tacit knowledge is present in various ways throughout the mathematical
exchanges of the seventeenth century. Correspondence by letters included
knowledge on how to write a letter, without spelling out the rules of letter
writing. In cases where these tacit codes were not applied, it is interesting
to give an interpretation of this step aside. More generally, tacit rules
of scientific exchange dictated what was to be made explicit or public in
a mathematical proof, and which parts were not. On the mathematical
level, curves were identified by a catalogue of properties, which was never
explicitly listed in its entirety. For instance, as soon as a curve was found
to have the property that its subtangent is the double of the abscissa, it
was identified with a parabola.
• A good deal of the development of mathematics in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries can be viewed as a process of making the practice of
mathematics increasingly explicit, thereby reducing the amount of tacit
knowledge and thus opening up a wide space of rational discussion and
achievements. However, this tendency to greater technical explicitness,
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which is evident in the typical manuscripts posted by mathematicians on
ArXiv every day, may induce historians of mathematics to neglect the per-
sistence of tacit knowledge in the most recent mathematics. The identifi-
cation of such tacit elements seems capable of affording significant insights
into the development of mathematics today.
• Similarly, several large scale mathematical enterprises of the last 100 years
like Bourbaki’s Éléments de mathématique or – in a different manner –
computer-based mathematical research, like the more recent projects to-
wards automated theorem proving (ATP), appear at first as signposts of a
massive pushing back of tacit knowledge. Looking more closely, however,
at details like the occasional warning signs in the margins of Bourbaki’s
volumes, or at problems related with the user interface, one sees that these
undertakings carry in fact their own heavy collection of tacit mathematical
practice.
• Developments in the history of mathematics are often loosely described as
moving from approximate, incompletely understood treatments, to fully
explicit, formal statements and their rigorous proofs. (See for instance
Breger’s contribution to [1].) Paying attention to the kind of tacit knowl-
edge which is mobilized before and after such a development often provides
a much more satisfactory analysis of the historical process than the mere
confrontation of precise versus imprecise methods. A case in point is the
rewriting of Algebraic Geometry in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury. In a 1926 letter to Hermann Weyl, Salomon Lefschetz significantly
described the Italian school of Algebraic Geometry, not as lacking rigor,
but as requiring “a terrible entrâınement ”. Later attempts, by Francesco
Severi and others, to defend their classical Algebraic Geometry against
growing criticism would invariably insist on the fact that all those tech-
nical assumptions or arguments which the modern algebraists could not
find in the Italian papers where indeed tacitly assumed, and well-known
to all geometers raised in the Italian school. The question whether the
category of tacit knowledge may render such arguments historically con-
vincing appears quite difficult, and can only be decided by very detailed
case studies.
• In contemporary mathematics, blogs and Wikis – the most famous prob-
ably being Terence Tao’s – currently provide an extended form of oral
culture in which less formal, formerly tacit approaches are written down
and opened to a broad mathematical public according to shifting and vari-
able rules.
The term “tacit knowing” or “tacit knowledge” which we explored here in its
bearing on the history of mathematics, comes from a philosophical context, but
has been mobilized before for the history of science. Michael Polanyi introduced
“tacit knowing”, or “tacit knowledge” in order to describe abilities which cannot
be fully described or explained (see [4]). In the history of science, the concept
has been mobilized in the study of the craft aspects of experimental science from
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the seventeenth century to the present day. The philosophical theory of tacit
knowledge has been much discussed over the years for instance also in the context
of mathematical education and curricula, which is not the purpose of the workshop
proposed here. More recently, the sociologist Harry Collins reassessed this notion
in [2], in particular distinguishing several types of tacit knowledge.
The theory of tacit knowledge marks a counterpoint to the “ideal of wholly
explicit knowledge” which took shape through the scientific revolution of the sev-
enteenth century. Among the different interpretations which have been given of
the concept of “tacit knowledge”, from a conscious under-articulation or deliber-
ate secrecy to the strong thesis that there are specific kinds of knowledge that
cannot in principle be fully articulated – the standard example being here riding a
bike – the application to the history of mathematics will focus on the weak sense:
tacit knowledge is what mathematicians selectively conceal, avoid articulating or
under-articulate, consciously or not. This does include the possible concealment
of information by mathematicians competing with others, as well as the case of
descriptions which are left incomplete because their authors assume, or know by
experience, that their readers share a certain knowledge with them. Tacit knowl-
edge is then built on experience or action, and cannot be fully described by rules
or words. It concerns any type of knowledge or skill used as subsidiary to the
performance and control of a mathematical task. The notion of tacit knowledge
could be applied to the history of mathematics, as suggested by Breger ten years
ago who used the greater level of abstraction created by the ongoing development
of mathematics to detect tacit elements in earlier texts. This is a challenging thesis
but obviously history of mathematics should not be reduced to just re-reading old
texts through the spectacles of more modern mathematical achievements.
At this point, more recent methods in the history of mathematics come to the
rescue: following a tradition that can be traced back to Ludwig Wittgenstein and
other authors of the 1930s and 1940s, the second half of the twentieth century has
seen authors such as Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger
placing the detailed analysis of scientific practice at the heart of history of science.
This goes hand in hand with the realization that tacit scientific knowing is acquired
by the individual scientist through a social context or network whose members
share a common know-how. Although unstated know-how tends to be difficult to
identify in a single mathematical text, shared tacit knowledge or know-how is more
accessible, often by way of comparison with other local mathematical cultures or
broader networks. It also tells a lot about mathematical (and strategic) practices
in a specified time period.
In the case of mathematics, Epple has adapted Rheinberger’s approach to the
history of mathematics in his book [3] on the history of knot theory. The notions
of epistemic objects and epistemic techniques are his key concepts to describe the
ways of the active researchers to handle the complex web of established theories
ready for use, formal and informal operational skills to deal with new phenomena,
and often vague general ideas about the kind of mathematical object under focus.
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Furthermore, the mathematical tools made use of in specific contexts or sites
are in most cases abstract techniques or objects, but may also be material devices,
from the measuring rod and compass to the analog integrator and computer. In
the Renaissance and early modern periods, the design and use of such instruments
was a core feature of mathematical practice, and the tacit knowledge involved in
acquiring the techniques of use or design was considerable. Yet such knowledge has
left historical evidence: Albrecht Dürer, most famously, tried to describe explicitly
what perpective artists were actually doing, including the gestures transmitted
through long workshop traditions. One aim of the conference will be to assess the
degree of continuity between these older traditions and those in evidence in more
recent mathematical practice.
Our main objective for the conference proposed here was thus to use the peculiar
bias of the distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge in order to re-invigorate
discussions about how the analysis of social networks on the one hand and of the
research practice of mathematicians on the other come together to afford a close-
up understanding of the historical process which we call mathematics. Last but
not least we hoped it would allow a better understanding of how mathematical
practices depend on larger cultural habits, or are embedded in larger cultural
contexts, including language, writing cultures, literary and rhetorical devices, and
craft knowledge.
The abstracts below show that the chosen theme has proved inspiring for most
of the speakers, whom it enabled to highlight aspects of the production and trans-
mission of mathematics which have often been neglected. The use of instruments,
which may imply a lot of bodily skills which can scarcely be transmitted through
words, is typically an example of such an understudied aspect of mathematics.
The practice of skills was also one of the starting points of Michael Polanyi in
his 1958 Personal Knowledge, as Jeanne Peiffer recalled in her short introduction
to the workshop. Before describing the tacit component of The Art of Knowing,
Polanyi suggests to grasp “the nature of the scientist’s personal participation by
examining the structure of skills” ([4, 49]and as his clue for this investigation, he
takes what he calls the well-known fact “that the aim of a skilful performance
is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which are not known as such to
the person following them” (ibid.). For Polanyi, an art, a skill, which cannot be
specified in detail – think at the famous example of riding a bike – cannot be
transmitted by prescription, since no such prescription exists. It can be passed
on only by example from master to apprentice. It follows that an art which has
fallen into disuse for the period of a generation is altogether lost. And here ques-
tions for the historian come in, mostly methodological questions. How can we, as
historians, recover not specified, not explicated skills, arts or knowledge ? Besides
methodological reflections, a whole range of case studies have been presented by
the participants of the workshop which have shown the various forms of tacitness.
Norbert Schappacher in his introduction briefly reminded the audience of Michael
Polanyi’s record:
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(a) As a researcher, in particular as director of the chemical-kinetics research group
in Fritz Haber’s Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute for physical chemistry and electrochem-
istry in Berlin-Dahlem starting in 1923; see [5], esp. chap. 2 and 3; cf. Polanyi’s
ranking among the leading scientists of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft at the
time in [6], vol. 2, p. 1254.
(b) As a thinker on economic theory, fighting the rather marxist tendencies of his
brother Karl. Hachtmann in [5], vol. 1, pp. 31-32, points to text of Polanyi’s from
as early as 1930, on the return of investment into the sciences (Rentabilität der
Wissenschaften) which kind of anticipated, in the concrete context of the Kaiser-
Wilhelm-Institutes [KWIs] menaced by spending cuts after the big economic crisis,
Pierre Bourdieu’s later theory of the exchangeability of actual, cultural, symbolic,
and social capital.
(c) Of the later unfolding of Polanyi’s ideas of personal later tacit knowledge,
driven by a desire (probably partly inspired by Ludwik Fleck) to balance Popper’s
so-called Logic of scientific discovery by more genuine descriptions of scientific
practice, and by a more Gestalt-theoretic approach of scientific work, and its part
in human culture at large.
More to the point of the subject of this meeting, i.e., the history of mathematics,
Polanyi’s letter to Lakatos of August 14, 1961 (from the Archives of the London
School of Economics; thanks to H.J. Dahms for sharing it with us) was quoted,
written in response to reading a draft of Lakatos’ Proofs and Refutations.There
one reads in particular : “If you are interested to find out as I am, how it can
be that these procedures of acquiring what we call knowledge, do in fact lead to
something that is knowledge, though it is, and must remain, impossible to define
these procedures, or set up criteria of their success, without appealing to powers
which are defined by no rules, then one feels that to speak of conjectures and
refutations etc. as answering my question, is to beg it.”
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approaches have their well-known problems, namely to find a systematic basis and
the fit with actual phenomena. Pasch focused on mathematical practice and con-
tentful reasoning, which left hims struggling with what we now call the surface
structure of language and ultimately led to unsurmountable problems, like those
of identity of propositions and sameness of content. Because of this, and despite
the fact that Pasch knew some of Frege’s, Peano’s, and Hilbert’s work, he failed
(or refused) to latch on to the development of modern logic. By looking sympa-
thetically at such failed attempts we get a better understanding of the conceptual
difficulties that were involved in arriving at the modern conception of logic.
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Tacit vs Explicit Images of Mathematical Logic: the reflexions of the
School of Peano
Erika Luciano
Since the end of the 19th century, the Peano School presents itself and is presented
as a group of scholars whose aim was to make their own scientific works as explicit
as possible. In fact, according to Peano, all the hypotheses and deductive steps,
even the most banal, must always be made explicit both in publications and in
teaching practices. Moreover, the ideography was constructed in such a way that
the meaning attached to the symbols was completely and unambiguously clarified.
At the level of history as well, each definition and proposition was to be accompa-
nied by an explicit account of its origin and development.
In actual fact, however, this historiographical depiction is less precise than might
be supposed. In fact, in spite of the intentions declared, there are frequent cases
of ‘missing’- that is tacitly used - propositions in the works of the Peano School.
Besides, the contrast between tacit and explicit regards the very adoption of the
symbols, because some of Peano’s collaborators confine the ideography to the pri-
vate sphere of their research, masking its use in publications. As regards the
historical aspects as well, that which is explicit in the Peanian written production
is comprised of only a set of notes which includes bibliographical references and
transcriptions of extracts from sources. What is implicit concerns all the rest, that
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is 1) the majority of primary and secondary literature used and 2) if there exists a
non-naive historiographical conception underlying the compilation of these notes.
Further, as regards this kind of extra-mathematical elements, it is necessary to
bear in mind that a stereotyping of roles within the Peano School becomes evi-
dent fairly early on. According to it, G. Vailati was ‘the philosopher’, G. Vacca
‘the historian’, M. Pieri ‘the geometer’, and so on. This makes it even more diffi-
cult to distinguish the tacit from the explicit dimension, because some of Peano’s
collaborators were prone to remain silent about certain components of their own
research, leaving to their colleagues, who were considered the ‘specialists’ in one
area or another, the task of explaining them.
In light of this overall picture, first of all we determine how, in the particular
case-study of the Peanian logical-foundational studies, the terms of the tension
tacit vs explicit are to be specified, taking into consideration the fact that, with
this expression, we allude to a very composite body of knowledge, constructed by
a community of scholars.
As far as the side of explicit is concerned, the problem consists in choosing a
printed work that is, or can be considered as, representative of the activities car-
ried out by the School of Peano. Among the possible alternatives 1 we have chosen
the three last editions of the Formulaire de Mathématiques (1901, 1902-03, 1908)
to represent the explicit side of the dichotomy because
• this is the only work that, at least along a general line, can be considered
representative of the School of Peano as a whole; 2
• this is the work for which we possess the majority of the unpublished
sources, which makes it possible to identify some of the tacit aspects of
the mathematics produced in the Peano School;
• both inside and outside the School, this treatise was indicated as the
summa of the research of Peano and his collaborators.
Instead, we have chosen to entrust the opposite side of the tension, that is the
tacit aspect, to the oral dimension that surrounds the editing of the Formulaire.
In fact, the close relationships that mature between the members of a working
group are based upon everyday contact which is essentially oral in nature and lead
1They include, for example, the journals Rivista di Matematica (1891-1906), Schola et Vita
(1925-1939) and some works by individual members of the Peano’s School, such as the inaugural
lecture given by Pieri in Catania, Uno sguardo al nuovo indirizzo logico-matematico delle scienze
deduttive (Annuario R. Univ. Catania, 1906-07, p. 21-82), or the article by A. Padoa, Logica
matematica e matematica elementare (Atti II Congresso Associazione Mathesis, Livorno, 1902,
p. 186-200), called ‘the manifesto of the Italian logicians’.
2In effect, according to U. Cassina, the Peano School comprised some forty researchers, but
only a part of those took part in editing the Formulaire. These are the ones that we indicate
as the ‘first generation’ of Peano’s students, including G. Vailati, G. Vacca, C. Burali-Forti, A.
Padoa, M. Pieri, the second generation being constituted, with few exceptions, by the Peano’s
interlinguistic collaborators and by the group of his female students who worked with him during
the last years of his life. Further, some students of this first generation provided just very marginal
additions to the Formulaire; others stopped the collaboration after the first edition, other ones
after the third or the fourth.
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inevitably to the creation and the socialization of a massive amount of tacit math-
ematical knowledge. Further, these oral testimonies, and in particular the con-
versations which many of Peano students remember vividly, can be reconstructed
today thanks to the correspondences among Peano, Vacca, Vailati, Pieri, Padoa
and Burali-Forti, the manuscripts conserved in the Peano-Vacca Archive in Turin
and the volumes of the Formulaire with Peano and Vacca’s autograph notes.
Once our dichotomy is fixed in terms of orality vs publication in the last three edi-
tions of the Formulaire, the mathematics produced in the Peano School becomes
a collection of tacit elements. Thus we discover that remaining altogether implicit
are the proofs of the Cantor-Bernstein theorem devised by Vacca with the help of
Vailati and Burali-Forti, and the systems of postulates of arithmetic proposed by
Vacca and Pieri. Examples of this same tenor could be listed by the dozen.
It is also possible to discern a criterion, obviously tacit, used by Peano to deter-
mine, from among the proposals submitted to him, what to promote to the level
of publication in the Formulaire. The tacit dimension is in fact more evident with
regard to meta-theoretical problems such as the criteria for choosing the primitive
concepts and propositions; the consistence and independence of the axioms; the
ways of schematizing language between the opposing poles of natural language
and ideographical symbolism; the sensitivity with regard to adherence to physical
or psychological reality of mathematical concepts, as opposed to their abstract
and formalist connotations, etc. The divergences regarding these questions - or
at least the differences in opinion among Peano’s collaborators - are remarkable.
In the absence of an agreement, Peano seem usually choose to gloss over such
reflections in the Formulaire, to the point of rendering the positions of individuals
indistinguishable, or even leaving them entirely implicit, omitting reference to the
literature that lay behind them, which also differed notably from student to stu-
dent.3
In light of this context, we illustrate in the second part of the talk:
• an example of a result by Padoa (his method for proving the independence
of the arithmetical postulates), which was promoted in its essence to the
explicit degree, after having circulated for a very brief time in tacit form;
• an example of a critical comment, by Vailati, about the chapter Logique
of the Formulaire, which remained tacit in its entirety forever, in spite of
attempts to render it explicit in the two last editions of the treatise;
• an example of a contribution by Pieri and Padoa (an hypothetical-deductive
system for the Euclidean geometry based on two primitive concepts), which
remained tacit almost completely and almost forever, even though it had
3There was a circulation of volumes and articles that were shared by Peano’s entourage. Not
by chance, the same publications by L. Couturat, E. Huntington, B. Russell, among the few to
be cited in the Formulaire, are present in the personal libraries of Peano, Vacca and Vailati.
Flanking this, however, was a set of readings (G. Frege, D. Hilbert, F. Brentano, A. Naville, . . . )
recommended by the individual members of the School, appreciated by some but not all of the
colleagues. In a few cases this second type of references was noted by Peano in his marginalia
and even more rarely it reached the level of explicit quotations in the Formulaire.
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arrived ‘a step away’ from being made explicit in the fourth edition of the
Formulaire.
Taking into account these examples, the question arises whether Burali-Forti,
Padoa, Vacca and Vailati’s allusions to Peano’s ‘bad tendencies’ towards his collab-
orators are true or not. According to our analysis, it appears plausible to maintain
that Peano was led to render and maintain explicit in the Formulaire all and only
those results (his own as well as others) that entered into the spirit of the treatise
as he conceived it and that he held to be best from the scientific or didactic point
of view, inviting the individual contributors themselves to make explicit, through
articles, the contributions that had not found a place in the treatise. Faced with
proposals for substantial modifications, Peano could become quite cutting. The
fact that the dissemination of the views with respect to meta-mathematical prob-
lems is prevalently entrusted to the tacit dimension is further ascribable to the
cultural context, which made it politically opportune to emphasize some impli-
cations while downplaying others, and which drove the School of Peano to make
explicit only what was widely shared, in the attempt to consolidate the image of
a cohesive group of researchers.
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Tacit Knowledge in Mathematics: Definition, Types, Examples
Herbert Breger
Tacit knowledge in mathematics is defined to be knowledge that is essential for the
understanding of a mathematical theory although it cannot be deduced from the
axioms resp. the presuppositions which were generally accepted at that time[1][2][3].
Three arguments were given in order to show that there is tacit knowledge in this
sense. Firstly, a computer to which the axioms of a particular theory are given
cannot produce a textbook of that theory. Secondly, experts use undefined words
like beautiful, natural, deep, profound, exotic, elegant in order to express state-
ments about the importance of a notion or a proof or on the structure of a theory.
This is knowledge on the meta level. Thirdly, it is well-known in mathematical
education that understanding a proof line by line does not necessarily imply to
understand the proof as a whole.
In the second part of the talk a number of types of situations in which tacit
knowledge occurs were discussed. There is a tacit knowledge of axiomatisation
(illustrated with the examples of Eilenberg and Steenrod’s axiomatisation of alge-
braic topology and Klein and Lie’s considerations of groups as well as Eilenberg and
Mac Lane’s introduction of natural transformations). Historians are well aware of
the problems of hindsight which originate from seeing a theory in the past with
